Using data from Bangladesh, this paper finds that the liquidity premium-the difference between the interest paid on illiquid and liquid savings accounts-is higher in commercial banks than in microfinance institutions. One possible interpretation lies in the higher prevalence of time-inconsistency among the poor. The observed difference in liquidity premia could be due to poor timeinconsistent agents willing to forgo interest on illiquid savings accounts in order to discipline their future selves. 2
Abstract
Using data from Bangladesh, this paper finds that the liquidity premium-the difference between the interest paid on illiquid and liquid savings accounts-is higher in commercial banks than in microfinance institutions. One possible interpretation lies in the higher prevalence of time-inconsistency among the poor. The observed difference in liquidity premia could be due to poor time-inconsistent agents willing to forgo interest on illiquid savings accounts in order to discipline their future selves.
Introduction
Economic agents with time-inconsistent preferences are tempted to under-save and overconsume (O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999) . To enforce self-discipline, these agents can use illiquid deposits that have embedded commitment devices against early withdrawal (Laibson, 1997) . Although the presence of time-inconsistent agents is well established (Della Vigna, 2009 ), surprisingly little is known about their impact on deposit remuneration in general, and on the liquidity premium-the interest spread between illiquid and liquid deposits-in particular.
We use data from Bangladesh to explore the consequences of savers' time-inconsistency on the liquidity premium. Since time-inconsistency is unobservable, we rely on the literature concluding that time-inconsistent agents are more frequent in poor populations than elsewhere.
To explain the prevalence of time-inconsistency in poor populations, Bertrand et al. (2004) and Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) emphasize that the poor constantly face stressful expenditure decisions involving harmful trade-offs and conflicts.
In addition, experimental evidence suggests that poor people are not only timeinconsistent; they are also aware of this condition. For example, households in Bangladesh accept negative returns on illiquid savings schemes proposed by informal deposit collectors (Rutherford, 2000) . Lacking commitment savings products, Indian women bind themselves through microcredit contracts (Bauer et al., 2012) .
1 Overall, poverty damages the ability to exercise self-control, and the consequences of giving in to temptation are harsher for poor 1 Interestingly, these findings are gender-sensitive. Dupas and Robinson (2013) find that most women actively take up the savings account offered by a village bank in Kenya while men do not. Possibly, women are more attracted to accessible commitment devices than men because they are poorer than men on average, enjoy less autonomy in financial decision-making (Guérin, 2006) , and are sometimes discriminated against by financial institutions (Agier and Szafarz, 2013) .
individuals than for wealthy ones (Bernheim et al., 2013) . The next section exploits this evidence.
The Liquidity Premium in Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, regular banks serve non-poor depositors while microfinance institutions (MFIs) offer deposit taking to the poor. Both offer liquid and illiquid savings accounts. The nomaturity liquid accounts ("savings deposits") place no restrictions on withdrawals, deposits, or transfers. In contrast, illiquid savings accounts put severe restrictions on deposits and/or withdrawals. Illiquid accounts are classified in two groups: recurring and term deposits.
Recurring deposits are made up of regular deposits, and withdrawals are forbidden prior to maturity or before a target balance has been reached. A term deposit consists of a single lumpsum payment with a fixed maturity. Term deposits are commonly proposed to wealthy savers, and recurring deposits to the poor. In MFIs, recurring deposits are placed in so-called "contractual" savings accounts, which help poor people to accumulate money (Rutherford, 2000) .
According to the Bangladeshi Central Bank (www.bangladesh-bank.org), the country has 47 regulated banks. We collected saving conditions for 28 of them from their websites. The market for micro-savings in Bangladesh is made up of six large MFIs, which attract 83% of total domestic micro-savings (Microcredit Regulatory Authority, 2011), and a myriad small ones. We found interest-rate data on the websites of five MFIs, including three of the six largest ones. Surprisingly, Grameen Bank, the largest MFI in Bangladesh, gives only partial information on its website. Fortunately, other sources (Dowla and Alamgir, 2003; Rutherford et al., 2004) provide information on Grameen's savings conditions. Overall, the five MFIs for which we managed to obtain complete data represent 64% of total micro-savings in Bangladesh.
2 Tables 1 and 2 summarize the information we collected for banks and MFIs, respectively.
For each financial institution, the tables give the following information: interest on liquid deposits, and minimum and maximum interest rates for recurring and term deposits, respectively. For these two types of illiquid accounts, interest rates increase with maturity.
Accordingly, the tables feature intervals rather than single figures. Liquidity premiums are interest-rate spreads between illiquid and liquid accounts. Averages are computed by using interval midpoints.
In each class of savings accounts, the interest rates vary across institutions, and there is no clear-cut distinction between banks and MFIs. In contrast, the average liquidity premiums are 6.5% for banks and 3.7% for MFIs. A t-test for equal means shows that the two groups of institutions offer significantly different liquidity premiums (p < 5%). Possibly, the difference stems from the pool of depositors with whom the two types of institutions work. In line with the theory linking time-inconsistency to poverty, MFIs would attract a larger share of timeinconsistent depositors than would mainstream banks. As a result, they would also collect a larger amount in illiquid savings, and therefore be less exposed to the risk of bank run.
However, commercial banks and MFIs differ in several ways other than the proportion of time-consistent agents. First, the market powers of banks and MFIs can be different. A higher market power could explain why MFIs exhibit a lower liquidity premium than banks do. Second, differences in contract terms, such as the maturity of illiquid accounts, can play a role. Third, MFIs differ from commercial banks not only in the population they serve, but also in their strategic choices. Conning and Morduch (2011) mention that the government and socially-oriented investors have a strong influence on MFI decision making. 
Conclusion
Evidence from non-banking firms shows that time-inconsistent agents have a sizeable impact on prices (Della Vigna and Malmendier, 2004) . In banking, evidence is lacking. Our preliminary results suggest that the liquidity premium varies with the clientele targeted by the financial institution (the poor vs. the non-poor). This could indicate that there is a significant link between savers' time-inconsistency and the liquidity premium.
We contend that the lessons to be learned from Bangladesh are also relevant for many other developing-and even developed-countries. In Bangladesh, the penetration of foreign banks is high (Clarke et al., 2003) and banks enjoy market power (Assefa et al., 2013) , like in many jurisdictions worldwide (Claessens and Laeven, 2004) . 3 Further work is needed not only to robustify these initial findings, but also to derive practical recommendations in terms of banking regulation and monitoring, a matter of considerable importance nowadays.
